On Mind, Brain, and Reductionism

For those interested in the discourse here on neuroreductionism, several articles in the latest Philosophical Investigations are worth checking out.  Here are the titles and abstracts:

Mind and Matter: A Physicist's View

John Polkinghorne 

Queens' College, Cambridge

ABSTRACT

Physics explores a universe of wonderful order, expressed in terms of beautiful mathematical equations. Mathematics itself is understood to be the exploration of a realm of noetic reality. Science describes matter in terms of concepts with mind-like qualities. The psychosomatic nature of human persons is best understood in terms of a dual-aspect monism, in which matter and mind are complementary aspects of a unitary being. The new science of complexity theory, with its dualities of parts/whole and energy/information, offers modest resources for the speculative exploration of this idea. The intrinsic unpredictabilities present in nature afford the metaphysical opportunity to consider dissipative systems as exhibiting top–down causality.

This looks to be a fascinating essay.  I am fascinated by and have done a bit of work in the implications of complexity theory, and actually think it may be quite important in thinking about the inordinately complex relationship between mind and brain.  (I allude to it in the comments here, where I note that some branches of science have even found ways to harness uncertainty and unpredictability without seeking to eliminate it).

Are We Our Brains?

Stephen Burwood

University of Hull

ABSTRACT

My aim in this paper is to destabilise the brain-is-self thesis, something that is now regarded in some quarters as philosophical commonsense. My contention is that it is the epithelial body that enters into the formation of our sense of self and that largely bears the burden of personal identity as well as playing the key role in grounding our psychological ascriptions. Lacking any sensorimotor or social presence of its own, the brain by itself cannot "underlie" selfhood, but only as part of the whole living human being. If the minded individual is embodied, this must mean more than being embrained.

Well.  Readers of this blog can probably guess that I am assuredly inclined to agree with the author, and the essay is obviously timely and relevant to some of the general discourse going on right now across different disciplines regarding the merits of the conceptual bases of much contemporary neuroscience.

Self and Self-Consciousness: Aristotelian Ontology and Cartesian Duality
Andrea Christofidou

Worcester College

ABSTRACT

The relationship between self-consciousness, Aristotelian ontology, and Cartesian duality is far closer than it has been thought to be. There is no valid inference either from considerations of Aristotle's hylomorphism or from the phenomenological distinction between body and living body, to the undermining of Cartesian dualism. Descartes' conception of the self as both a reasoning and willing being informs his conception of personhood; a person for Descartes is an unanalysable, integrated, self-conscious and autonomous human being. The claims that Descartes introspectively encounters the self and that the Cartesian extent of inner space is self-contained are profound errors, distortions through the lenses of modern theories.

Count me among the growing number of thinkers -- across disciplines -- who think that Descartes has generally gotten a raw deal when it comes to responsibility for mind-body dualism.  David Morris insists that strict mind-body dualism is a creature of the Victorian age,, not stemming from Descartes, and Robert Martensen's early modern history of the brain is particularly good for a sensitive and nuanced exploration of this idea.  This essay seems an interesting contribution to this body of work.

Sadly, I do not have full-text access to these articles, so if any kind reader does and wishes to help a poor graduate student out, giddy up.

(cross-posted to Neuroethics & Law Blog)

Comments

[Sam Whittle]

If you still haven't acquired the full text of these articles I can email you the pdfs. And thanks for the post - I wouldn't have found these otherwise.

[Daniel S. Goldberg]

Thanks, Sam. Several people were kind enough to provide me with access already.