On Moral Esperanto

Stuart Rennie, editor of the excellent Global Bioethics Blog, has an outstanding post on the dubiety of the search for universal consensus in bioethics (a subject both near and dear to my heart, and a position which I endorse whole-heartedly):

But it is -- and has always been -- precisely the lack of consensus that has driven many a moral philosopher or theologian to seek a kind of Ethical El Dorado, the one true set of ethical judgments that everyone (purely on the basis of being human) has to agree with. You can see the tendency at work in human rights documents, in international codes of research ethics, and in philosophical treatises. The desire for a universal morality (as opposed to the mores of some particular culture and tradition) seems to express a rage for order, and disgust with seemingly endless and messy ethical disagreement and conflict. Why can't we all get along?

The search for what Rennie terms the Ethical El Dorado, and what Walzer has termed "moral Esperanto," is quixotic, IMO.  It is, to borrow a Wittgensteinian metaphor, an attempt to open doors that are painted onto walls.  Ethics is an extremely messy business; we do not all speak the same moral language.  And given that languages are conceptual schemes in which we actively construct our world, that means we live our lives within divergent moral worlds (yes, yes, this is more Quine than Davidson, but there is no doubt both would agree on the notion of language as a conceptual scheme).  This is not to construct an atomistic notion of the moral life, because, again, as Wittgenstein showed, private languages do not exist.  To speak a language at all is to share some kind of weltanschauung.

We can understand each other; we can work to understand different worlds in context of the languages the inhabitants of those moral worlds speak. 

But we cannot all speak the same moral language.  Hence universal norms of morality are, IMO, chimerical.  But, the typical objection goes, what of justice? Who would disagree that justice is a crucial virtue? And if so, doesn't that show there are some kinds of universal norms? Rennie supplies one of my preferred responses to this line of argument:

The success rate [of the search], at least since Plato, has been abominable. What typically happens is that in order to become potentially universalizable, the set of judgments becomes so abstract as to become meaningless. It is almost as if one climbs a mountain top to transcend human disagreements and conflicts of value, only to find that -- while the panoramic view is great -- you have run right out of oxygen. But if more substantive content is added to the judgments, people start bickering about them again, and the reality of moral diversity comes flooding back.

It is perfectly fine to suppose that consensus could be obtained on an ethical norm at a high level of generality.  But as the tradition of virtue ethics reminds us -- in particular, see MacIntyre -- our moral lives are inherently localized and particular, because we practice our lives in these local, particular worlds.  As the Zen expression puts it, wherever you are, that's where you are.  Thus, the moral issues that arise from abstract commitments to justice only take on meaning in particular cases or contexts.  This is why Paul and Jane may agree perfectly well on the need for justice, but may understand what justice requires in any given case in diametrically opposed ways.

This is a blog post, not an essay, so I'll stop here, other than to note that these kinds of issues are at the core of the approach I plan to take in my dissertation (on pain).  Kudos to Rennie for raising the issue so thoughtfully and succintly.   

Comments

[Brian Barker]

As the reference to Esperanto may give the impression that it is not in use already - as a language - can I invite anyone who wishes to check? http://www.esperanto.net

[Anonymousss]

Nice Entry.
But why not explain "weltanschauung".
Would have made life easier.

[Dan Bustillos]

Great post, Daniel.

[Daniel S. Goldberg]

Thanks, Dan!